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FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE?
MANDATORY AIDS TESTING FOR
MARRIAGE LICENSE APPLICANTS
INTRODUCTION
The discovery of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)'
stimulated widespread public fear2 similar to previous outbreaks of ty-
phoid' and tuberculosis.4 Because of the disease's fatal effects,5 health
1. Scientists at the Center for Disease Control (CDC) discovered AIDS in June
1981. They reported a rare form of pneumonia, pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, in five
homosexual men. At about the same time, the CDC reported instances of Karposi's
sarcoma, a form of cancer usually associated with elderly Mediterranean men, appear-
ing with frequency in young homosexual males. I. SLOAN, AIDS LAW: IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY (1988). By September 1982 the disease received
its name. S. PANEM, THE AIDS BUREAUCRACY (1988).
See also U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services Centers for Disease Control, A
Cluster of Karposi's Sarcoma and Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia Among Homosexual
Male Residents of Los Angeles and Orange Counties, California, 31 MORBIDITY & MOR-
TALITY WEEKLY REP. (June 18, 1982).
2. A 1985 poll revealed that over one-third of the public believed that AIDS was as
contagious, or more contagious than the common cold. Note, The Constitutional Rights
of AIDS Carriers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1274 n.6 (1986).
Also in 1985, a Los Angeles Times poll reported that fifty-one percent of respondents
favored quarantining AIDS carriers; forty-eight percent favored requiring persons test-
ing positive to the virus to carry an identification card; and fifteen percent favored tat-
tooing AIDS carriers. N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1985, at A24, col. I.
3. Typhoid traces its origins in the United States to the Jamestown settlement in the
early seventeenth century. Of 105 persons who first landed in Jamestown, over one-half
died the first summer. The disease is highly contagious and early epidemics were the
result of infected sailors entering Eastern seaports. The disease's symptoms include
swelling and burning fevers. G. MARKS & W. BEATrY, EPIDEMICS 164-67 (1976). See,
e.g., People v. Robertson, 302 11. 422, 134 N.E. 815 (1922) (upholding the constitution-
ality of a quarantine requirement for typhoid carriers).
4. The legal treatment of tuberculosis traces it origins to the Code of Hammurabi.
The last full blown outbreak occurred in the nineteenth century, although the disease
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officials responded by declaring AIDS the nation's primary health pri-
ority.6 In many states AIDS legislation soon followed.7 Louisiana and
continues to infect people today. The mortality rate has diminished considerably in
industrialized countries. In the United States, for example, the disease appears in six
out of every 100,000 persons. The disease is contagious and is casually transmitted,
usually through the air or in milk. Tuberculosis manifests in the lungs causing tissue
scarring due to infectious eruptions. R. GALLAGHER, DIsEAsES THAT PLAGUE MOD-
ERN MAN 167-78 (1969).
In Moore v. Draper, 57 So. 2d. 648 (Fla. 1952), the Florida Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of a state statute requiring the quarantine of persons afflicted with
tuberculosis. The court stated that tuberculosis victims "left disease, misery, sorrow,
and death in their wake." Id. at 648. See generally Gray, The Parameters of
Mandatory Public Health Measures and the AIDS Epidemic, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REv.
505 (1986) (comparing AIDS quarantine with tuberculosis quarantine).
5. See infra notes 21-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the disease's
destruction of the immune system.
6. Assistant Secretary of Health Edward Brandt labeled AIDS the Public Health
Service's number one priority in 1983. Brandt admitted the statement may have been
overly reactionary, but was necessary to alert Washington legislators to the disease's
seriousness. PANEM, supra note 1, at 14.
Soon after Brandt's declaration, two committees - the Intergovernmental Relations
and Human Resources Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations,
and the Subcommittee on Science and Technology of the House Energy and Commerce
Committee - formed to examine possibilities for federal funding of AIDS research. Id.
at 31-32. Estimates of the disease's spread fueled the government's concern for the
public health. One estimate indicates that by 1991, between 179,000 and 270,000
Americans will die from AIDS. SLOAN, supra note 1, at 2.
7. The following represents a sampling of the more controversial AIDS legislation:
Colorado's proposal of a quarantine of AIDS patients ultimately failed in the legisla-
ture. House Bill 1290, 55th General Assembly. See also Lack of Accord Kills Colorado
Bill, 1 AIDS POL'Y & LAW (BNA) 2 (May 21, 1986). See generally Parmet, AIDS
Quarantine: Revival of An Archaic Doctrine, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 53 (1985) (arguing
that quarantine applied to AIDS patients must be narrowly tailored to the state's health
interest). Instead, the Colorado legislature enacted an AIDS reporting requirement.
According to the law, physicians treating AIDS-positive individuals must report find-
ings to the State Department of Health. COLO. Rnv. STAT. § 25-4-1402 (1989). For a
discussion of the Colorado reporting statute, see Note, Reportability of Exposure to the
AIDS Virus: An Equal Protection Analysis, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 1103 (1986) (challeng-
ing the law on right of privacy and equal protection grounds) [hereinafter AIDS Re-
portability].
In Texas, legislators contemplated criminalizing homosexuality as a means of protect-
ing the public from the spread of AIDS. PANEM, supra note at 24. See generally Note,
AIDS-A New Reason to Regulate Homosexuality, 11 J. CONTEMP. L. 315 (1984) (argu-
ing that the AIDS epidemic ended the trend toward liberalizing anti-sodomy statutes)
[hereinafter A New Reason to Regulate]. Also in Texas, legislators proposed a marital
testing requirement if reports indicated a dramatic increase in the disease's spread. Pre-
Nuptial AIDS Screening Taxes Illinois Health System, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1988, at
Al, col. 3.
Because of the flurry of reactionary legislation, some states enacted laws designed to
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Illinois joined the ranks' by enacting mandatory premarital AIDS test-
ing requirements.' These laws, however, were short-lived.1" The re-
cent repeal of the Illinois law" illustrated that mandatory premarital
protect the AIDS patient from discrimination. Wisconsin, for instance, enacted laws
aimed at specifically protecting the interests of AIDS carriers. One law prohibits em-
ployers from discriminating against employees on the basis of AIDS unless the state
epidemiologist determines that the individual poses a significant threat to the commu-
nity. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 103.15 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989). Another law only allows
HTLV-III testing if an informed individual gives his consent. Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 146.025(2)(1) (West 1989).
New York recently enacted a law whereby health officials possessed authority to in-
form individuals of the test results of AIDS positive partners. Disclosure, however,
must accompany a court order authorizing the physician to disclose. N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 2785(2) (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1990).
Municipalities also have reacted to the crisis. When AIDS first became an issue in
New York and San Francisco, municipal officials immediately closed gay bathhouses.
Leaders believed that incidents of multiple and anonymous sex were primary conduits
for the disease's spread. Commentators suggest the move may have been too rash.
They argue that the closings foreclosed a plausible avenue for educating those most in
need of information about the disease. See Rabin, The AIDS Epidemic and Gay Bath-
houses: A Constitutional Analysis, 10 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 729, 742 (1986).
Similar to the Wisconsin law, Los Angeles and San Francisco responded to incidents
of AIDS discrimination by enacting ordinances prohibiting AIDS discrimination in
housing, education, and employment. The Los Angeles ordinance prohibits discrimina-
tion in housing, employment, education, and use of the city facilities and services
against AIDS patients and those perceived as AIDS patients. Los Angeles Ordinance
160,289 (Aug. 16, 1985). Similarly, San Francisco enacted an ordinance prohibiting
employers from discriminating against persons infected with AIDS. Moreover the ordi-
nance also prohibits employers from mandatorily testing employees for AIDS. San
Francisco Ordinance 49,985 para. 20,950B.
8. Louisiana enacted a law requiring couples to undergo a mandatory AIDS test.
After much controversy, the Louisiana legislature repealed the law in 1988. Bill No.
345, effective July 7, 1988. The Illinois law is described infra note 11.
The Louisiana law suffered from many of the same problems as the Illinois law. For
example, the Department of Health reported a decline in marriage license applications
following the law's enactment. Illinoisans Fault Prenuptial Test for AIDS, N.Y. Times,
April 16, 1988, at A6, col. 4. Additionally, couples avoided the law by traveling to
neighboring states to marry. Pre-Nuptial AIDS Screening Taxes Illinois Health System,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1988, at Al, col. 3.
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 204 (1980 & Supp. 1989) (repealed 1989). Inter-
estingly, Missouri has a mandatory pre-marital AIDS testing requirement which is ef-
fective as soon as the Center for Disease Control deems pre-marital testing appropriate.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 191.692 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
10. Four months after the Illinois law became effective, AIDS specialists urged its
repeal. Several bills appeared in the Illinois House of Representatives calling for repeal,
of which one bill died in committee by only one vote.
11. On June 23, 1989, the Illinois legislature approved a bill repealing the AIDS
law. The Senate approved the measure by a 33 to 23 vote, while the House approved
the bill 65 to 48. Instead of mandatory testing, couples are now given AIDS informa-
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testing is unfeasible. Because many states have legislation involving
marriage and AIDS testing in some form,12 an analysis of the Illinois
law and its shortcomings will provide guidance to other states contem-
plating similar laws.
Briefly, the Illinois law required couples applying for marriage
licenses to present proof of having taken an AIDS test. 3 Although the
law did not absolutely bar marriage if either partner tested positive,14
its requirements unnecessarily burdened couples desiring to marry.' 5
tional brochures upon application for a marriage license. Pre-Nuptial Test for AIDS
Repealed, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1989, at A6, col. 1.
On September 11, 1989, Illinois Governor James R. Thompson signed the bill repeal-
ing the pre-marital AIDS law. As of Monday, September 11, 1989, the tests revealed
only 52 AIDS-positive individuals out of 250,000 people tested. Mandatory AIDS Test
is Repealed in Illinois, N.Y. Times, September 12, 1989, at A16, col.2.
12. At present, other states enacting legislation relating to AIDS and marriage in-
clude: California, which conditions licensing upon proof that the clerk offered the appli-
cants an opportunity to undergo an AIDS test, CAL. CIVIL CODE § 4300(c) (West 1983
& Supp. 1990); Georgia, which allows voluntary AIDS testing and distribution of AIDS
pamphlets for couples, GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-35.1 (1982 & Supp. 1989); Hawaii,
which requires the state to provide AIDS information upon applying for a license,
HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-5 (1985 & Supp. 1989); Idaho, which requires marrying
couples to present proof that they received an AIDS informational pamphlet, IDAHO
CODE § 32-412A (1983 & Supp. 1989); Indiana, which requires the issuing clerk to
distribute AIDS information packages and offer voluntary testing, IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-7-3.5 (Burns 1987 & Supp. 1989); Kansas, which distributes AIDS educational
materials, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6006 (1985); Rhode Island, which requires the clerk
to offer voluntary testing for applicants, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-2-3 (1988); and Virginia,
which distributes AIDS information packets to marrying couples, VA. CODE ANN. 20-
14.2 (1983 & Supp. 1989).
State legislative proposals include: Alabama House Bill 2 (introduced Jan. 14, 1986);
Michigan House Bill 5276 (introduced Jan. 8, 1986); New Jersey Assembly Bill 1485
(introduced Jan. 14, 1986); New York Assembly Bill 8436 and Senate Bill 7006 (both
introduced Jan. 8, 1986); Pennsylvania House Bill 2032 (introduced Jan. 22, 1986); and
South Carolina House Bill 3246 (introduced Jan. 14, 1986).
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 204(b) (Supp. 1988).
14. Id.
15. Following the law's first year, officials at the Illinois Department of Health re-
ported a 20% decline in marriage license applications. In Cook County, for example,
marriage license applications fell from 44,755 in 1987 to 35,158 in 1988. AIDS Test Has
40,000 Fleeing the State to Wed, Chicago Tribune, January 4, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
For those who desire to avoid the expense and delay of the testing procedure, they
must leave the state to wed. For instance, health officials in Milwaukee reported an
increase in Illinoisans travelling to Milwaukee to wed. A Milwaukee deputy clerk
stated that "people are looking here out of desperation. With most of them, it seems to
be a planned effort to avoid the AIDS test." Pre-Nuptial Screening Taxes Illinois Health
System, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1988, at Al, col. 5.
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Testing proved costly1 6 and time consuming.17 Although the Illinois
legislature overturned the law merely because it was impractical, the
law posed difficult legal, moral, and philosophical questions. When a
state enacts AIDS legislation,"8 it embarks on the difficult task of bal-
ancing public health interests19 against an individual's freedom from
government intrusion.20
This Note considers whether mandatory premarital AIDS testing
would achieve the proper balance in light of current medical knowl-
edge and constitutional doctrine. Additionally, this Note uses the Illi-
nois law as a model in its discussion of premarital AIDS testing laws.
Part I briefly covers the disease's background and available testing pro-
cedures. Part II discusses the Illinois law as illustrative of mandatory
premarital testing laws. Part III examines premarital testing and the
constitutional questions testing raises under right to privacy, due pro-
cess and equal protection doctrines. Finally, Part IV presents less in-
trusive alternatives.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Medical
Scientific research revealed that a retrovirus known as human T-cell
lymphotropic virus type III (HITLV-III) causes AIDS.2" HTLV-III
16. The cost of an AIDS test falls between $25 and $300 depending if the applicant
must undergo confirmatory testing. Illinoisans Fault PreNuptial Test For AIDS, N.Y.
Times, April 16, 1988, at A6, col. 4.
17. The time element varies from laboratory to laboratory, ranging from two days
to two weeks. Telephone interview with representative from the Center for Disease
Control (March 1989).
18. At present 43 states have enacted specific forms of AIDS legislation.
19. Illinois' goal was to prevent the transmission of AIDS from husband to wife and
mother to child. In the AIDS Confidentiality Act, the Illinois legislature indicated that
testing provides a valuable mechanism to protect the public health. ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 111 1/2, para. 7302-2(1) (Smith-Hurd 1988 & Supp. 1989). See infra notes 67-74
and accompanying text for a discussion on the state's broad police power when health
concerns are at issue.
20. See infra notes 75-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the individual's
privacy concerns.
21. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, AIDS RECOMMENDATIONS AND GUIDE-
LINES I 1 (Nov. 1982-May 1987). Dr. Robert Gallo of the National Institute of Health
discovered HTLV-III in the fall of 1982. Closen, Conner, Kaufman & Wojcik, AIDS:
Testing Democracy--Irrational Responses to the Public Health Crisis and the Need For
Privacy in Serologic Testing, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 835, 855 (1986). Simultaneously,
Dr. Luc Montagnier, from the Pasteur Institute in Paris, discovered lymphadenopathy
associated virus (LAV). Lymphadenopathy refers to swollen lymph nodes which house
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contains genetic material appearing in human chromosomes.22 Once
in the chromosomes, the virus reproduces at a rapid rate,23 thus pro-
gressively destroying the immune system.24 This renders the body vul-
nerable to a variety of opportunistic infections25 and malignant
conditions26 not typically associated with AIDS-free persons.27 More-
over, discovery of a vaccine combatting HTLV-III has proven ex-
tremely difficult because the virus rapidly changes its genetic
structure.28
many of the body's T-cells where AIDS resides in the body. Isolation of a T-Lympho-
tropic Retrovirus From a Patient At Risk for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS), 220 SCIENCE 868-71 (1983).
One of the early international problems concerning AIDS centered on the split be-
tween the National Health Institute's HTLV-III categorization and the Pasteur Insti-
tute's LAV categorization. Both the American and French researchers desired patents
for the antibody test under their respective categorization. Ultimately, the French filed
suit against the U.S. government claiming misappropriation of its technology. The two
sides resolved the dispute by agreeing to share the rights and royalties of patent applica-
tions filed before May 25, 1985. The two sides also agreed to allocate eighty percent of
the royalties to a fund devoted to AIDS research. PANEM, supra note 1, at 28-29.
22. Aids Reportability, supra note 7, at 1108 n.40 (noted in FETTNER & CHECK,
THE TRUTH ABouT AIDS (Rev. Ed. 1985)).
23. Id.
24. The immune system fights foreign matter, including a host of bacteria and can-
cers which bombard the body daily. Only when the immune system is oppressed does
an infection or cancer develop. Closen, Connor, supra note 21, at 856-58.
T-cells regulate the immune system. The virus infects these T-cells known as T-lym-
phocytes. Over time the victim's immune system weakens, eventually resulting in the
victim's death. SLOAN, supra note 1, at 1.
25. An opportunistic infection is any infection which an intact immune system
would ordinarily suppress. Closen, Connor, supra note 21, at 858. Pneumocystic carinii
pneumonia is an example of an opportunistic infection. See supra note I for a discussion
ofpneumocysti cariniipneumonia and its frequent appearance in homosexual males suf-
fering from AIDS.
26. Two kinds of malignant conditions appearing with frequency in AIDS patients
are Karposi's sarcoma and non-Hodgkins lymphoma. See Karposi's Sarcoma and
Pneumocystis Pneumonia Among Homosexual Men-New York City and California, 30
MORBIDrrY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 305, 305-08 (1981). See also Non-Hodgkins
Lymphoma in 90 Homosexual Men: Relation to Generalized Lymphadenopathy and Ac-
quired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 311 NEw ENG. J. MED. 565, 568 (1984) (discuss-
ing the increase in non-Hodgkins lymphoma in homosexual men since the outbreak of
AIDS in the 1980's).
27. SLOAN, supra note 1, at 1.
28. Aids Reportability, supra note 7, at 1108 n.40. "Development of a vaccine is
likely to be slow. The Institute of Medicine and National Academy of Sciences
[predicts] that development of a vaccine is at least five to ten years away." SLOAN,
supra note 1, at 4.
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The virus' primary modes of transmission are sexual contact,29 blood
transfusions, organ transplants and perinatally from mother to child.30
Although the disease is communicable, it cannot spread by casual con-
tact or through the air in the same manner the common cold spreads.31
Certain groups of persons have been identified at high risk. High risk
candidates include: (1) homosexual and bisexual men,32 (2) present or
past intravenous drug users,33 (3) hemophiliacs who received infected
blood products, 34 and (4) newborn infants of high risk or infected
mothers.35
29. Blood, saliva and semen house the virus. Persons transmit the virus either
through intimate sexual contact or by sharing contaminated hypodermic needles. Pro-
visional Public Health Service, Inter-Agency Recommendations for Screening Donated
Blood and Plasma For Antibody to the Virus Causing Acquired Immunodeficiency Syn-
drome, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 2 (1985).
30. Center for Disease Control, supra note 21, at 58.
31. See OR. REV. STAT. (1989) (finding that AIDS does not spread by casual con-
tact); AIDS Reportability, supra note 7, at 1109.
In 1985, a New York Times poll indicated that about half of the American public
believed casual contact could spread AIDS. Poll Finds Many AIDS Fears That the Ex-
perts Say Are Groundless, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1985, at BI1, col. 3. In a 1988 poll,
respondents appeared more educated about the disease: three out of four respondents
understood that AIDS spreads primarily through sexual contact. Also, eighty-one per-
cent of the respondents supported increased federal funding for AIDS research. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 8, 1988, at B6, col. 5. See also Sande, Transmission of AIDS: The Case
Against Casual Contagion, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 380-382 (1986) (arguing that the
medical community must play an active role in quelling hysteria over the casual spread
of AIDS).
32. "In the United States, over seventy-three percent of adult AIDS patients are
homosexual and bisexual men." Within that group, eleven percent experienced a his-
tory of intravenous drug use. Center for Disease Control, supra note 21, at 11.
33. Heterosexual men and women engaging in intravenous drug use account for
seventeen percent of adult AIDS patients. Center for Disease Control, supra note 21, at
11. See also The Prevalency of HIL V-Ill/Lay Antibodies Sharing of Needles Among
Users of Intravenous Drugs, 314 NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 446-447 (1986).
34. Transfusion related AIDS represents about one percent of AIDS cases in the
United States. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Associated With Transfusions,
310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 69, 74 (1984).
35. Most children infected with HTLV-III received the virus perinatally. In utero
transmission occurs with less frequency. In one case reported from Australia, a child
acquired the virus postnatally, possibly from breast-feeding.
Seventy percent of pediatric AIDS cases occurred among children whose parents
either suffered from the disease or were members of a high risk group. Twenty percent
of the cases occurred among children receiving blood or blood products. In ten percent
of the cases investigations were incomplete. Center for Disease Control, supra note 21,
at 56.
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Heterosexual transmission is generally less prevalent.36 Transmis-
sion may occur, however, if persons engage in sexual relations with
others deemed at high risk or with persons from countries where heter-
osexual transmission frequently occurs.37 Apparently, male to female
transmissions occur with greater frequency3" than female to male
transmissions.39
B. AIDS Testing
The enzyme-linked immunosorbent essay (ELISA) test represents
the most common antibody test used to identify the AIDS virus." The
test is inexpensive41 and provides a high sensitivity42 threshold which is
36. As early as 1982, reports of heterosexual transmission existed. One case re-
ported the disease in a female sexual partner of a heroin addict. Heterosexual Transmis-
sion of HTLV-Ill, 85 EPIDEMIOLOGY BULLETIN 1 (Nov. 1985).
37. Center for Disease Control, supra note 21, at 11. Heterosexual transmission is
the primary mode of spreading the disease in Africa. See Closen, Connor, supra note
21, at 865. Haitians were at one time considered a high risk group because of the fre-
quency of heterosexual transmission in Haiti. The CDC guidelines no longer identify
Haitians as high risk. AIDS Reportability, supra note 7, at 1107-08.
38. Male to female transmission ordinarily involves men who are characterized as
high risk candidates - either intravenous drug users or bisexual men. Heterosexual
Transmission of HTLV-Ill, 85 EPIDEMIOLOGY BULLETIN 1 (Nov. 1985).
39. The most prevalent form of female to male transmission is by prostitutes. Id.
For example, health officials in Seattle tested ninety-two prostitutes for the HTLV-III
virus. The tests revealed that five percent of the prostitutes carried the virus. See Heter-
osexual Transmission of Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III Lymphadenopathy-As-
sociated Virus, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 561 (Sept. 20, 1985).
40. "The test [uses] HIV proteins which have been grown in tissue cultures and
coated in plastic dish wells. Scientists remove blood from the patient and sandwich it
between the HIV protein and an antibody probe. When applied to the blood sample,
the probe causes a color reaction. The higher the antibody level in the blood sample the
stronger the color reaction. [Accordingly,] the degree of color change determines the
positivity level." Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, Screening for HIV Infection: Risks, Bene-
fits, and the Burden of Proof, 14 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 259, 260 (Dec. 1986).
41. See supra note 16 for a discussion of the test's cost.
42. The test's predictive value calculates the blood sample's sensitivity and specific-
ity. Sensitivity refers to the probability that a test result win be positive when the dis-
ease is present. Griner, Magewski, Mushiin & Greenland, Selection and Interpretation
of Diagnostic Tests and Procedure, 94 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 553, 557 (1981).
Specificity, on the other hand, refers to the probability the test result will be negative
when the antibody is not present. Id. at 557. For example, a test with a ninety-five
percent sensitivity threshold will give ninety-five positive results and five false negative
results. Banks & McFadden, Rush to Judgment: HIV Test Reliability and Screening, 23
TULSA L. J. 1, 6 (1987). Because ELISA primarily operates as a blood screening mech-
anism, the test has a higher sensitivity rate which results in an increased false positive
rate. Id. at 16.
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useful in mass screenings of infected blood.43 The medical community
emphasized the test's limitations as a screening device and refused to
endorse it as a diagnostic test.' Their reasons focus on: (1) the test's
unreliability in detecting the virus in low risk populations45 and (2) its
ability only to detect the AIDS antibody rather than the AIDS virus
itself.46 Consequently, ELISA fails to provide an indicia of AIDS or
the possibility that a person testing positive could develop the syn-
drome's effects.4" Moreover, ELISA yields more false positives and
false negatives than desirable.4 8 The test's inaccuracy becomes greater
when applied to marriage license applicants. Generally, when adminis-
tered to low risk groups, the test yields greater false positives.4 9
43. The fear of transfusion-related AIDS prompted the United States Department
of Health and Human Services to approve the ELISA test for the limited purpose of
screening blood. Update: Public Health Service Workshop in T-Lymphotropic Virus
Type III Antibody Testing-United States, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY
REP. 477 (1985).
44. AIDS Reportability, supra note 7, at 1110. Although the medical community
declined to use the test for diagnostic purposes, persons testing positive are presumed
infected with the virus and capable of transmitting the disease to others. See Banks &
McFadden, supra note 42, at 5 (1987). See also Petricciani, Licensed Tests For Antibody
to Human T-lymphotropic Virus Type III, 103 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 726, 728
(1985) (noting that the nature of commercial testing kits, such as the ELISA, are useful
for averting infected blood, but should not be used as a basis of notifying HTLV positive
individuals).
45. The test has a greater accuracy rate when applied to high risk populations. In
lower risk populations, however, the test reveals more false positives and false negatives.
See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the test's inaccuracy.
46. AIDS Reportability, supra note 7, at 1112.
47. ELISA and Western Blot are indirect tests, which means the tests merely infer
the disease's presence. As a result, an indirect test is usually less specific in pinpointing
the existence of the disease than a direct test. Banks & McFadden, supra note 42, at 5.
48. False positives refer to individuals who the test erroneously depicts as housing
the AIDS antibody. False negatives refer to individuals who are infected, but who the
test erroneously depicts as AIDS free.
49. Suppose 100,000 marriage license applicants submit to the ELISA test. Of
those who take the test, thirty are actually infected. Using the standard sensitivity
threshold of 93.4% and specificity threshold of 99.78%, twenty-eight of the infected
individuals and 220 non-infected individuals would test positive. See the chart below.
Abbott Elisa Test
Low Risk Population
Sensitivity 93.4% and 99.78% Specificity
Actually Not %True
Infected Infected Total Results
Positive Elisa 28 220 248 11.3%
Negative Elisa 2 99,750 99,752
Total 30 99,970 100,000
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To counter ELISA's inaccuracies, health officials ordinarily adminis-
ter a confirmatory test known as the Western Blot test.50 The medical
community refrained from using the Western Blot test in mass blood
screenings because it is expensive and time intensive.51 Although the
Western Blot test may reduce some false positives, it nevertheless may
fail to identify all of ELISA's false positives.52 Researchers believe that
similar biological factors causing ELISA's false positives may also lead
to false Western Blot results.5 3 Additionally, those testing falsely nega-
tive under ELISA will probably avoid any confirmatory testing.
Serious concerns arise when an individual's liberty interests and rep-
utation depend on tests with limited reliability and predictive value.5 4
The frequent incidents in which AIDS victims suffer discrimination
and public hostility necessitate that legislation substantially promote
the legislative purpose without unduly burdening the individual.5
Thus, an analysis of AIDS legislation must consider whether the law
promotes the state's purpose without contributing to misconceptions or
fuelling hostility toward socially and politically unpopular groups.
Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 40, at 263. See also Wrhen Results Are Wrong,
L.A. BAR J., Sept. 11, 1987, at 4, col. 1, for a discussion of ELISA's false positives and
false negatives.
50. Because the Western Blot test is an indirect test the same concerns associated
with ELISA are also associated with Western Blot. See supra notes 48-49 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of ELISA's high false positive rate. Consistent with testing
guidelines, the Illinois law required a confirmatory Western Blot test. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 40, para. 240(b) (1980 & Supp. 1989).
51. Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 40, at 262.
52. Id.
53. Id. Suppose now the 248 applicants who tested positive to the ELISA take the
Western Blot test, The Western Blot test would confirm thirty-nine as positive of whom
twenty-eight are true. Id. at 263.
54. In an analogous context, courts have begun hearing challenges to mandatory
drug testing requirements. On the whole, courts have not been receptive to constitu-
tional challenges to drug testing requirements. See, eg., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execu-
tives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989) (no fourth amendment violation to require
mandatory drug testing of rail employees involved in accidents); Spence v. Farrier, 807
F.2d. 753, 756 (8th Cir. 1986) (urinalysis test followed by confirmatory test contained
sufficient indicia of reliability to provide evidence of drug use); Harmon v. Auger, 768
F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1985) (urinalysis testing finding consumption of marijuana held
valid); Peranzo v. Coughlin, 608 F. Supp. 1504, 1507 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (although testing
reliability is a serious concern, due process rights do not require scientific exactitude);
Wykoff v. Resig, 613 F. Supp. 1504 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (marijuana testing sufficiently
reliable to justify disciplinary action).
55. See generally A New Reason to Regulate, supra note 7, at 339 (arguing that the
homosexual community should not suffer from indifference and undue burden when a
life threatening epidemic is involved).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol38/iss1/6
MARITAL AIDS TESTING
II. PREMARITAL AIDS TESTING-THE ILLINOIS STATUTE
AIDS is primarily an urban concern.5 6 Because states ordinarily
delegate health matters to municipal governments,57 municipalities
face severe economic and social costs in combatting the syndrome.5 8
Despite the financial burden, governmental responses must reflect reli-
ance on existing medical data.
Generally, legislatures may justify premarital AIDS testing because
it falls within the state's police power to monitor the public's health
and welfare. 9 For example, the Illinois law aspired to prevent the
spread of AIDS between husband and wife, or mother and child6° by
requiring marriage license applicants to undergo an AIDS antibody
test.61 If either party tested positive, the state required administering
physicians to inform both marriage partners of the test results.62 Addi-
tionally, physicians reported the result to the Illinois Department of
Public Health. 63 Follow-up counselling was available for individuals
who tested positive." Estimates revealed that the annual cost of imple-
56. The following represents reported AIDS cases as of February 20, 1989: New
York City, 21,021; Chicago, 2,241; Los Angeles, 6,270; San Francisco, 6,884. Tele-
phone interview with representative from the Center for Disease Control (March 1989).
57. See Damme, Controlling Genetic Disease Through Law, 15 U.C. DAvis L. REv.
801, 804 (1982) (stating that local health authorities, under authority from the state,
initiate most measures controlling the spread of infectious diseases).
58. The health costs of AIDS are staggering. Some estimates indicate that by 1991
health care for AIDS patients will be about $8.5 billion. Study Finds Most Health In-
surers Screen Applicants For AIDS Virus, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1988, at Al, col. 2.
Additionally, there are increased shortages of public hospital space and medical admin-
istrators, particularly in New York where AIDS is most prevalent. Lack of Nurses
Impedes New York AIDS Care, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1988, at Al, col. 2.
59. For a discussion of the state's traditional role as protector of the public health,
see infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
60. Premarital AIDS testing was part of a package of AIDS legislation in Illinois
which also permitted the state to trace contacts of AIDS positive individuals and im-
pose limited quarantine on AIDS victims. Illinois Governor James R. Thompson said
the law's intention was "to balance our obligation to protect the public health while
preserving the individual rights of our citizens." L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 22, 1987, at 5,
col. 3.
61. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, para. 204(b) (1980 & Supp. 1989).
62. Id. See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-146 (Law Co-op 1985 & Supp. 1989)
(exempting a physician from liability when notifying the spouse of an AIDS-infected
person).
63. Id.
64. Id.
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menting the test is about $5.6 million.65 After approximately one year,
premarital testing revealed only twenty-three AIDS positive persons. 66
III. CONSTITUTIONAL RAMIFICATIONS
A. Background
State health laws present the challenger with a formidable obstacle-
the state's police power. The state possesses considerable power to reg-
ulate individual lifestyles when public health is a concern.67 In Jacob-
son v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts,68 the Supreme Court upheld a
state's smallpox vaccination requirement over due process challenges.
69
The Court indicated that an individual's liberty interests were not ab-
solute7' and often subject to governmental restraints.71 These re-
straints overcome constitutional challenges when they are reasonable
and prove "essential to the safety, health, peace, good order and morals
of the community."72
There is a natural tension between the individual's desire for per-
sonal autonomy and the government's responsibility to ensure an or-
derly and safe society. The state concededly possesses the ability to
require forms of testing, vaccination, and quarantine when confronting
65. AIDS Test Has 40,000 Fleeing State to Wed, Chicago Tribune, January 4, 1989,
§ 1, at 3, col. 2.
66. Id.
67. States derive authority to police health matters from the tenth amendment of
the United States Constitution. Courts traditionally have given the states broad power
to regulate matters of local health. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203
(1824), the Court stated that "[i]nspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every
description... remain subject to state legislation." See also People v. Strautz, 386 II.
360, 365, 54 N.E.2d 441,443 (Ill. 1944) (noting "[i]t has almost universally been held in
this country that constitutional guaranties [sic] must yield to the enforcement of the
statutes and ordinances designed to promote the public health as a part of the police
powers of the State").
Historically, the American public health establishment traces its origins to 1798 with
the passage of the Act for the Relief of the Sick and Disabled Seamen. This Act pro-
vided medical care to sailors and established funds for construction of hospitals. The
Act's purpose was less for the care of the sick and more for the protection of the public
health by preventing the entry of diseases via incoming sailors. PANEM, supra note 1, at
36.
68. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
69. Id. at 39. The statute required all inhabitants of Massachusetts to submit to a
smallpox vaccination. Those over twenty-one who refused were fined. Id. at 12.
70. Id. at 26.
71. Id.
72. Id. (citing Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 89 (1890)).
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threats to the general health." Only necessity and efficacy, however,
justify significant intrusions. When the intrusion invades constitution-
ally-determined fundamental rights, the state must consider less bur-
densome alternatives.74 Constitutional doctrines, therefore, provide
the individual with a significant check against governmental
overreaching.
B. Right to Privacy
The right to privacy is one check on government intrusion."
Although the Federal Constitution fails explicitly to mention a privacy
right,76 the Court has recognized constitutionally protected privacy
zones." Specifically, the Court has recognized that marital relations
fall within a protected privacy zone.7" When a law interferes with an
individual's right to privacy, the law limiting the right must serve a
compelling state interest and the means used to effectuate the law must
be narrowly drawn to serve the interest.7 9 In short, the Court applies
strict judicial scrutiny to laws interfering with privacy interests.
The difficulty in challenging mandatory premarital AIDS testing is
proving the existence of a privacy right. An AIDS blood test involves
only a minor personal invasion. In light of the acceptability of testing
marriage applicants for venereal diseases,80 challenging the test on
grounds of personal invasion alone is insufficient to warrant strict judi-
73. See, eg., People v. Robertson, 302 Ill. 422, 134 N.E. 815 (1922) (upholding a
quarantine requirement for a woman with typhoid).
74. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 15-2, at 1306 (1988). See gen-
emily Craven, Personhood: The Right to Be Left Alone, 1976 DuKE L.J. 699 (states have
complete discretion to regulate lesser rights of individuals).
75. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (a law criminalizing the use of
contraceptives among married persons invalidated on right to privacy grounds). Also,
the Illinois Constitution incorporates an express right to privacy. ILL. CONST. art. I,§ 6.
76. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156 (1973), the Court infers the right to privacy
from the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution. Justice
Goldberg in his concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 487, based the
right to privacy on the ninth amendment of the Constitution. See generally TRIBE,
supra note 74, § 15-3, at 1308.
77. See, eg., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
78. See, eg., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 389 (1978) (recognizing the marital
relationship as a fundamental right). See infra notes 122-28 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Zablocki.
79. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
80. For a discussion of venereal disease testing, see infra notes 130-35 and accompa-
nying text.
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cial scrutiny. Courts traditionally uphold statutes allowing bodily in-
vasions for vaccinations81 and syphilis testing.82 An AIDS testing
requirement should differ, though, because of the possible disclosure of
guarded personal matters and the social stigma attached to AIDS
carriers.83
If the Court recognized an AIDS patient's right to informational pri-
vacy, then statutes such as the Illinois law must fall. Although a state's
interest in containing and preventing the spread of AIDS would prove
compelling, the means would not be narrowly tailored to achieve this
end. Premarital testing laws are grossly underinclusive because they
would omit testing those who are at highest risk while burdening those
who are least likely to carry the virus. Laws similar to the Illinois law
would impose unnecessary anxiety and burdens on a low risk group.
In contrast, those more likely to pose a health threat would avoid alto-
gether the law's requirements. Thus, if the right to privacy means any-
thing, it means an individual should control dissemination of personal
information."4 This especially holds true when disclosure of AIDS car-
ries a great potential for abuse and discrimination.
The Supreme Court addressed the right to informational privacy in
Roe v. Whalen.85 The plaintiffs in Whalen used the right to privacy to
challenge a New York law86 requiring patients receiving certain kinds
81. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the State's
power to require vaccination.
82. See, eg., Baker v. Strautz, 386 Ill. 360, 54 N.E.2d 441 (1944) (upholding
mandatory testing of prostitutes for venereal disease for health reasons).
83. AIDS victims suffer extreme forms of discrimination in housing, education,
health care, and insurance coverage. With respect to the disclosure issue, see generally
Note, Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99 HARv. L. Rav. 1274, 1288 (1986)
(asserting states enacting mandatory testing must provide sufficient safeguards to ensure
the information will not be disclosed publicly, made accessible to unauthorized persons,
or used to deprive the individual of government benefits).
84. See TRIBE, supra note 74, § 115-16, at 1389. See generally Gentry, Redefining
Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rnv. 233, 288 (1977) (the threat of misusing personal
information is "as permanent as the records themselves"). See also Shattuck, In the
Shadow of 1984: National Identification Systems, Computer Matching and Privacy in the
United States, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 991 (1984) (arguing the increased use of computer
technology for record-keeping poses serious threats to privacy interests). But see
Thompson, Secrecy of Tests Is Unjustified on Legal and Economic Grounds, L.A. DAILY
J., July 3, 1987, at 4, col. 3 (confidentiality rules should be relaxed for AIDS carriers
because the tort system does not address the harms they inflict by the time of suit the
AIDS carrier is either dead or bankrupt).
85. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
86. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3300-3397 (Consol. 1985 & Supp. 1990).
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of prescription drugs to register themselves with state health agen-
cies.87 The Court upheld the registry law, but with reservations."
First, Justice Stevens identified two traditional privacy interests - the
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters and the interest in
making important personal decisions.8 9 Second, Stevens acknowledged
that accumulating personal information threatened privacy interests.'
Because patients suffered no adverse effects from registration, the
Court was satisfied that the New York law provided sufficient safe-
guards to protect the patient's privacy interests. 91
Mandatory premarital AIDS testing, on the other hand, threatens to
expose an individual's past intimate experiences. This undeniably falls
within the ambit of the right to privacy.92 These kinds of laws also
impair an individual's interest in safeguarding personal information
and making important decisions. 93 For example, the Illinois law al-
lowed full disclosure to the prospective spouse but did not prohibit the
prospective spouse from disclosing the test results. The law should
have more fully restricted access to this type of information because
testing positive for AIDS often labels an individual as promiscuous, as
a homosexual or as a drug addict. Strained or abandoned relationships
87. Physicians and patients challenged the New York law requiring doctors to re-
port to state health agencies patients to whom they prescribed dangerous, but legitimate
drugs. A lower federal court invalidated the law because it interfered with the doctor-
patient relationship - a zone of privacy - with a needlessly broad sweep. 429 U.S. at
596.
88. Id. at 606-07 (Brennan, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 599-600.
90. Id. at 605.
91. Id. at 603. The statute provided for various safeguards protecting the regis-
trants from accidental or intentional disclosure. The statute expressly prohibited public
disclosure of the registration and imposed criminal penalties for willful violations. Ad-
ditionally, other safeguards were taken. A locked wire fence, protected by an alarm
system, surrounded the information room. Computer tapes storing the confidential in-
formation were kept under lock. Administrators only ran the tapes "off-line" to prevent
computer access by terminals outside the information room. Id. at 594.
92. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (legislation prohibiting
the use of contraceptives which operated directly on intimate relations between husband
and wife violated the right to privacy); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445
(1972) (expanding Griswod to include unmarried persons).
93. The Illinois legislature enacted the AIDS Confidentiality Act to protect AIDS
patients from disclosure of their condition. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 7301-
7316 (Smith-Hurd 1988 & Supp. 1989). The premarital testing requirement, however,
relieved the physician administering the AIDS test from liability when he disclosed the
results to the non-infected partner and the Department of Health. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
40, para. 204(b) (1980 & Supp. 1989).
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with family and friends flow from such categorizations and often lead
to severe discrimination and loneliness.94
Arguably, states are justified in alerting prospective spouses to AIDS
carriers.95 The crucial issue, however, is not whether it is immoral for
an infected person to conceal his condition, but whether it is desirable
for the state to interfere and make disclosure decisions for the individ-
ual. Even if the state is justified in intervening, testing marriage license
applicants is not the most effective means of preventing the syndrome's
spread.
If a state's purpose is preventing the virus' spread from one partner
to another,96 it is unlikely that couples have not already exposed each
other to the virus by the time they plan to marry.97 Premarital testing
naively assumes that couples refrain from sexual intercourse before
marriage. Alternatively, if the state's purpose is to prevent the syn-
drome's spread from mother to child, marriage licensing fails as an
effective means of achieving this end.98 Not all marrying couples de-
sire or are able to bear children. Moreover, the high incident of unwed
mothers illustrates that marriage is not a precondition to childbirth.
Accordingly, premarital testing is overinclusive.
The AIDS epidemic presents a dilemma to an information-hungry
94. Studies show AIDS patients suffer from higher incidents of suicide than other
terminally-ill patients. Much of their depression results from abandonment by family
and friends. AIDS Patients Are Found to Have an Extremely High Suicide Rate, N.Y.
Times, March 4, 1988, at B5, col. 2.
95. Many cases exist in which AIDS carriers have intentionally infected their sex
partners. In one poll of 134 high risk individuals, thirty-two indicated that during cas-
ual sex they would not inform their partners they carried AIDS. AIDS Testing Without
Consent Reported, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1988, at A7, col. 5. Note that a premarital test-
ing requirement would not correct incidents of casual premarital sex where the infected
party conceals his condition.
96. See supra notes 60-61 for a discussion of the Illinois statute's intent.
97. Jim Karpiak, Associate director of the AIDS Foundation in Chicago, said
"[t]he virus is spread through sexual activity, not marriage vows. Most ... couples
have already engaged in sex with each other and, if one of them has the virus, the other
has already been exposed." Illinoisans Fault PreNuptial Test For AIDS, N.Y. Times,
April 16, 1988, at A6, col. 4.
98. The Center for Disease Control (CDC) recommends counseling and testing wo-
men who are: (1) intravenous drug users, (2) born in countries where heterosexual
transmission occurs, (3) prostitutes, or (4) involved in sexual relations with intravenous
drug users, bisexual men, hemophiliacs, or persons from countries where heterosexual
transmission occurs. The CDC discourages counselling and testing women who are not
in the recommended testing group. The CDC fears the inaccurate results of testing a
low risk group. Center for Disease Control, supra note 21, at 59-61.
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society.99 No one would advocate limiting access to medical informa-
tion concerning the disease and its transmission. The problem arises,
however, when access to information carries the potential for abuse.
AIDS reporting threatens to undermine our faith in confidential com-
munications to physicians or other closely situated parties."c° If an
individual fears a breach of confidentiality, fewer volunteers will sub-
mit to testing lest they subject themselves to the community's wrath. 10
This would strain efforts in researching, updating, and controlling the
disease.102 Thus, laws such as the Illinois law"°3 threaten confidential
communications and ultimately prove counterproductive to the state's
health interest.
Even if the threat to confidentiality fails as a compelling argument
against premarital testing, the likelihood of falsely labeling an individ-
ual as a potential AIDS carrier should spell doom for premarital test-
ing laws."° Premarital testing targets persons in the lowest possible
risk group.' 05 Marriage license applicants are the least likely to carry
AIDS or possess a strong affinity for intravenous drug use.'06 Esti-
mates indicate that if testing revealed 100 individuals testing positive to
both tests, about one third would constitute false positives. 17
99. TRIBE, supra note 74, § 15-16, at 1389.
100. See generally Note, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: AIDS and the Conflict-
ing Physicians Duties of Preventing Disease Transmission and Safeguarding Confidential-
ity, 76 GEO. L.J. 169 (1987) (analyzing the complex relations between physician and
AIDS patient in the context of physician liability).
101. Note, Doctor-Patient Confidentiality Versus Duty to Warn In The Context of
AIDS Patients And Their Partner, 47 MD. L. REv. 675, 687 (1988).
102. Id. at 687.
103. The Illinois law released the physician from liability when he communicated
the test results to the non-infected couple. The law provided in part:
Such notification of the other party to the proposed marriage, and of the appropri-
ate public health authority, shall not be deemed a violation of any duty or right of
confidentiality established by law, but the physician shall maintain the confidential-
ity of such test results with respect to other persons, except as otherwise provided
by law.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 204(b) (1980 & Supp. 1989).
104. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the law's high
false positive rate when applied to low risk groups.
105. See Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 40, at 262 (categorizing marriage
license applicants as members of the lowest risk population).
106, Wedded to a Stupid Idea, L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 2, 1988, at 4, col. 1.
107. Id. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the inac-
curacy of AIDS testing.
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C. Due Process and Equal Protection Analysis
Because premarital testing would condition marriage upon proof of
an AIDS test,1"' due process concerns also arise. Just as they regulate
health, states traditionally possess substantial authority to regulate
marriage." In Maynard v. Hill, "0 the Supreme Court stated that the
state traditionally possesses the power to govern marriages. 11 Conse-
quently, state marriage laws requiring venereal disease testing" 2 and
prohibiting same sex113 or incestuous marriages' 1 4 constitute permissi-
ble restrictions on the marriage right. 115
108. The law provided:
It shall be unlawful for the county clerk of any county to issue a license to marry to
any person who fails to present for filing with such county clerk a certificate issued
and signed by the physician who administered the [AIDS] test.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, para. 204(b) (1980 & Supp. 1989).
109. States derive authority to regulate marriage from the tenth amendment of the
United States Constitution. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) ("domestic
relations have long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States").
110. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
111. Id. at 205. The Court stated that "[m]arriage, as creating the most important
relation in life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than
any other institution, has always been subject to the control of the legislature." Id.
Maynard involved a challenge to an Oregon territorial statute allowing dissolution of
marriage. The two issues presented to the Court were (1) whether the dissolution of the
marriage statute was valid; and (2) if the law was valid, whether it permissibly defeated
the wife's right to a donation of land which the husband held. The Court upheld the
dissolution law, id. at 207-08, and denied the wife any portion of the husband's land.
Id. at 216.
112. Cf. Curry v. Corn, 277 N.Y.S.2d 471, 52 Misc. 2d 1035 (1966) (marriage part-
ners have a right to know whether prospective spouse suffers from a diseased condition);
Fisher v. Sweet 35 A.2d 756, 154 Pa. Super. 216 (1944) (enacting syphilis testing re-
quirement is a public health measure and within the province of the state's power).
113. See, eg., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d. 588 (Ky. 1973) (invalidating a mar-
riage between two females because same sex marriages did not constitute a recognizable
marriage in Kentucky). See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.04 (West 1986) (providing
"no county court judge or clerk of a circuit court in this state shall issue a license for
marriage of any person... unless one party is a male and another a female"). See
generally Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573 (1973) (argu-
ing that denial of same sex marriage denies individual equal protection of the law).
114. See, eg., Catalona v. Catalona, 148 Conn. 288, 170 A.2d. 726 (1961) (denying
widow's benefits to claimant because she was her husband's niece, thus violating a state
law against incestuous relationships).
115. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 397 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (the
Court has not held yet that "all regulations touching upon marriage implicates [sic] a
'fundamental right' triggering the most exacting judicial scrutiny"). See also UTAH
CODE ANN. § 53A-13-101 (1989) (marriages of AIDS carriers are void).
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Until Loving v. Virginia,1 6 the Supreme Court had not held any
state restriction on marriage unconstitutional. "7 In overturning a Vir-
ginia miscegenation statute,"' the Loving Court held that racial re-
strictions on the freedom to marry violated the equal protection
clause." 9 In addition, the Court invalidated the law on due process
grounds because the restrictions violated a couple's liberty interest in
choosing whom they desired to marry.12 ° The Court noted that "the
freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness....""'
The Court in Zablocki v. Redhai 12 2 added to Loving and explicitly
deemed marriage a fundamental right.12 3 The Court overturned a Wis-
consin law requiring persons owing child support to obtain a court or-
der before marrying.124 The Court based its decision on equal
protection grounds because the classification unduly burdened indi-
116. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
117. J. AREEN, FAMILY LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 29 (2d. ed. 1985).
118. The Lovings violated § 20-58 of the Virginia Code which prohibited whites
and blacks from leaving the state to marry and then returning to the state to live after
the marriage. Section 20-59 provided a one-year prison term for whites and blacks who
intermarried. Id. at 4.
119. Id. at 12.
120. Id.
121. Id. Loving follows and establishes a trend of case law which gives marriage
heightened constitutional protection. See, eg., Cleveland Board of Education v. La
Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) ("freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage
and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (the right to
privacy in marital relations is older than the Bill of Rights); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (the right "to marry, establish a home and bring up children" falls
within the liberty interests the due process clause protects).
122. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
123. Id. at 383. The Zablocki Court noted that recent decisions placed the mar-
riage right within the right to privacy framework, deriving from the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause. Id. at 384.
124. Id. at 387. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, compared the right of
marriage to the right to privacy. He stated that the "decision to marry and raise the
child in a traditional family setting must receive equivalent" protection as other rights
affecting family matters, such as procreation, childbirth, child rearing and family rela-
tionships. Id. at 386. See generally Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (rights
associated with childbirth); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (rights associ-
ated with family relationships); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) (rights associated with procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (rights associated with child rearing and education).
The Wisconsin statute's purposes were to (1) induce the marrying parent into seeking
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gents with respect to the marriage right.'2 5 The statute absolutely
barred the marriage of persons, who were either too poor to comply
with child support requirements or who could not prove that their chil-
dren would not become wards of the state. 126 For some, compliance
with the law proved so burdensome that they abandoned their right to
marry.'2 7 The Court failed to hold all restrictions on marriage invalid,
but did enunciate a requirement applying to laws affecting the marriage
right. The Court noted that laws imposing "reasonable regulations
that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the mari-
tal relationship" are permissible. 128
Laws aimed at preventing the spread of AIDS are compelling be-
cause they purportedly address public health concerns.' 29 The issue,
therefore, is whether the state has chosen a reasonable method of
achieving the legislative purpose. One difficulty in challenging premar-
ital AIDS testing rests with distinguishing between an AIDS testing
requirement and a syphilis testing requirement, the latter of which
courts traditionally have upheld.' 3 As Justice Stewart indicated in
Zablocki, states may condition marriage on passing a venereal disease
examination.' 3 ' Arguably, the same health interests that justify
syphilis' 32 testing apply to AIDS testing. Like AIDS, syphilis spreads
financial counseling before undertaking new financial obligations, and (2) encourage
non-custodial parents into making child support payments. Id. at 388-89.
Justice Marshall rejected both justifications. Counseling could not have been one of
Wisconsin's justifications because the statute failed to provide counseling or release the
court order requirement after the person sought counseling. Id. Marshall rejected the
second rationale because indigent parents could not make their child support payments.
Thus, the requirement acted as an absolute obstacle to their right to enter marriage.
For those who could afford to make payments, other alternatives existed to enforce
child support payments. Id. at 389.
125. Id. at 377, 383. Justice Stewart concurred only in the result because he be-
lieved the majority erroneously placed the constitutional analysis within the framework
of the equal protection doctrine. He would have placed it within the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process analysis. Id. at 391-92 (Stewart, J. concurring).
126. Id. at 387.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 386.
129. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the state's
public health interest.
130. See supra note 112 for cases upholding venereal disease requirements.
131. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 392 (Stewart, J., concurring).
132. Syphilis is a chronic and highly contagious disease. Venereal syphilis, commu-
nicated by sexual contact, accounts for about ninety to ninety-five percent of cases. The
disease develops in three stages. In the primary stage, lesions appear on the genitals and
occasionally in the mouth. As the disease progresses to the secondary stage, bodily
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by sexual contact; 133 it slowly deteriorates the body;13 ' and before the
1940s, it was incurable.135
Significant differences exist, however, between AIDS testing and
syphilis testing. 136 Premarital syphilis testing at least tenably repre-
sents a closer connection between the state's health interest and the
means the state employs to protect that interest. Unlike AIDS, which
afflicts a narrowly defined group, syphilis afflicts a broad segment of
the population.137 Heterosexuals, who are apt to marry, are as capable
as any group of spreading the disease. Accordingly, marital testing is
an effective way to trace the disease. The same does not hold true for
AIDS testing because the syndrome afflicts narrowly defined groups
not likely to enter into marriage.
Futhermore, justification for premarital syphilis testing rests on out-
dated medical information and historical accident. Some states recog-
nize that syphilis testing requirements fail to reflect current medical
knowledge and refuse to impose testing requirements. 38 Historically,
support for syphilis testing requirements occurred during an era when
application of due process principles to fundamental values lay dor-
mant. 139 Thus, judicial deference to premarital venereal disease testing
finds support with the venerable ghost of the past-judicial precedent.
disturbances, such as fever and anemia, develop. The tertiary stage is the most ruinous
as bone lesions, deterioration of the bones, paralysis and deterioration of the flesh pro-
gresses to the point of death.
Transmission occurs when syphilis organisms enter the host through skin breaks. It
is rarely transmitted by indirect contact with contaminated articles. GALLAGHER,
supra note 4, at 151-66.
133. Id. at 153.
134. Id. at 160. Similar to AIDS, syphilis is a slow borer. When the victim dies it is
usually the result of another symptom, such as paresis or heart attack. Id.
135. Id. at 160-61. In the 1940s scientists began using penicillin to combat the dis-
ease. As a result, the disease dramatically declined because the syphilis organism never
developed a resistance to penicillin. Scientists have yet to develop a vaccine. Id.
136. See supra notes 75-94 and accompanying text for a discussion under the right
to privacy analysis.
137. "Venereal syphilis is one of the most widespread communicable diseases."
GALLAGHER, supra note 4, at 164.
138. Twenty-five states do not require a venereal disease test before marriage. They
are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah (does not require testing, but voids the mar-
riage if one or both spouses are infected), Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
139. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 503 (11th ed. 1985). Professor Gun-
ther believed that due process principles lay dormant between the decision rendered in
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
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AIDS legislation, in contrast, follows a revitalization and expansion of
due process principles."4
Because premarital AIDS testing differs from syphilis testing,
Zablocki's reasonable regulation principle should apply. 141 Statutes
similar to the Illinois law would fail to reasonably regulate the spread
of AIDS without burdening the right to marry. Although, on its face,
a premarital testing law would not bar individuals testing positive for
AIDS from marrying, its practical effects are such that it may indeed
work as an absolute bar. 142 Once prospective spouses receive notice of
their partner's positive test results, the future marriage quite likely will
not occur. Also, the law may delegate in an off-handed way choices of
who individuals may marry, thus violating Loving's principles. 143
In addition to creating due process concerns, the law implicates
equal protection principles. 1" Because of the high cost of confirma-
tory testing, the law distinguishes between the indigent and the non-
indigent with respect to the marriage right. 45 Although the Court
does not recognize indigency alone as a suspect classification, 146 it does
apply strict scrutiny to state laws which classify with respect to funda-
mental rights. 47 Premarital testing laws, like the Wisconsin law in
Zablocki, burden the poor who desire to marry. 148 A challenge solely
(1965). Id. Syphilis was a medical concern primarily during the 1940's. See supra note
132.
140. GUNTHER, supra note 139, at 503.
141. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of Zablocki.
142. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (Virginia's miscegenation stat-
ute did not facially classify on the basis of race, but its underlying purpose was to ra-
cially discriminate).
143. See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of Loving.
Note also that one of the privacy interests the Court identified in Roe v. Whalen was the
ability for the individual to make personal choices, unfettered by the government. See
supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rhalen.
144. The equal protection clause is in the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
145. See supra note 65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the cost.
146. When a law disadvantages a suspect class the Court will apply strict scrutiny.
Generally, the characteristics of a suspect class are (1) a history of discrimination, (2)
political powerlessness and (3) immutable characteristics.
See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (denying sus-
pect classification to indigents opposing school financing system).
147. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of Zablocki.
148. See supra note 16 for the cost of testing. The Western Blot test is anywhere
between $150-4300. Telephone interview with representative from the Center for Dis-
ease Control (March 1989).
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to ELISA's cost is untenable because it imposes a minor financial bur-
den, but the higher cost of the Western Blot test places a great burden
on the poor. 149 Accordingly, premarital testing laws could act as a
complete bar to marriage, and thus must fall as a result of Zablocki's
principles.
IV. LESS BURDENSOME ALTERNATIVES
State laws may survive strict judicial scrutiny if the state shows that
the law represents the least burdensome alternative.1 50 Mandatory
premarital AIDS testing fails to represent the least burdensome and
efficient means of policing the spread of AIDS. For example, instead of
requiring mandatory premarital testing, some states offer voluntary
testing and distribute AIDS information to marrying couples.1 1 The
receipt of this information presumably opens communication between
the parties, thus allowing them to discuss the effects of the disease.
Voluntary testing provides a better alternative, particularly for the
poor. It relieves indigent couples of the financial burdens of confirma-
tory testing, thus not unduly interfering with their right to marry.
Moreover, voluntary testing respects the individual's interest in choos-
ing whether or not to subject himself to test results which carry a sig-
nificant social impact. Under a voluntary scheme, the state, therefore,
allows the individual the right to choose to take the test and disclose
the results. The state does not unnecessarily intrude on confidential
and personal matters.
Premarital testing requirements also unduly interfere with an indi-
vidual's private communications. A less intrusive scheme would allow
the AIDS positive individual the opportunity to disclose his condition
to his prospective spouse. If the state were concerned that the infected
partner would conceal his condition, it could intervene only after first
giving the individual the first opportunity to disclose. According to
this scheme, the state respects the individual's privacy interest and still
preserves its public health interest.
149. See supra note 16. The ELISA and Western blot tests are not independent of
one another. When the state enacts mandatory testing, the confirmatory Western Blot
test is necessary, particularly when liberty interests are at stake. Accordingly, any form
of institutionalized testing, with the exception of blood screening, must include a confir-
matory test.
150. See supra note 74 and accompanying text for a discussion of circumstances in
which the court applies strict judicial scrutiny to laws interfering with fundamental
rights.
151. See supra note 12 for a listing of states with voluntary testing.
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Additionally, administering AIDS testing to marriage license appli-
cants costs the state a considerable amount of money and strains medi-
cal resources. 152 Instead, the state should divert money and resources
toward programs directed at those who pose the highest risk to the
public. For example, a more controversial alternative would provide
sterilized needles to intravenous drug users. This would reduce the use
of contaminated and lethal needles. The state could provide condoms
to sexually active individuals with a particular emphasis on bisexual
and homosexual men. Finally, the state could implement educational
programs aimed at teaching safe and responsible sex. These alternative
programs would result in a much more efficient allocation of state's
funds than testing individuals posing the least risk.
V. CONCLUSION
The 1980s ushered in a new and deadly killer-AIDS. Public hyste-
ria and fear accompanied the disease. Reacting to that fear, lawmakers
proposed and enacted a host of AIDS legislation much of which is ill-
advised and misinformed. Illinois recently repealed a premarital test-
ing law which at best institutionalized AIDS hysteria in the form of a
state law. Other states contemplating similar legislation should avoid
Illinois' mistake both for practical and constitutional reasons. Premar-
ital testing fails as a constitutional means of policing the disease's
spread for three reasons. First, it targets those least likely to pose a
public risk-marriage license applicants. Second, the burdens the law
imposes on the individual's right to privacy and marriage far outweigh
the slight health benefit to the state. Finally, premarital testing is not
the most effective or cost-efficient method of controlling the spread of
AIDS.
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152. See supra note 65 and accompanying text for cost analysis.
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